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GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS 
1. "R" refers to the record of compiled District Court 
Pleadings. 
2. "RT" refers to the Reporter's Transcript of Trial. 
3. "TH" refers to a Transcript of a hearing. There were 
hearings on the Summary Judgment Motion and Motion for 
Findings on September 10, 1985, November 13, 1985> and 
December 10, 1985. 
4. Citation Form. References in a citation to the record or 
a transcript sequentially indicate page and line. 
References to pages and lines are separated by a colon, 
subsequent pages are separated by a semi-colon, (eq. RT. 
45:1-5; 47:10-12 indicates Reporter's Transcript, Page 
45, lines 1 through 5, and Page 47, line 10 through 12.) 
LIST OF PARTIES 
1. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
2. Pat Clark, an individual Defendant, Respondent and 
Defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to give effect 
to the clear and unambiguous language of the Consent 
Order and Judgment which permits an agricultural use of 
the easement. 
2. Whether the trial court's construction of the Consent 
Order and Judgment is supported by the record. 
3. Whether there were material issues of fact precluding 
Summary Judgment as a matter of law. 
4. Whether the Order and Judgment is ambiguous, and if so, 
whether the Court erred in resolving the ambiguity on 
Summary Judgment. 
5. Whether the trial court failed to resolve inferences 
from admitted facts in a light most favorable to 
appellant. 
6. Whether the trial court's finding of abandonment of the 
easement is supported by clear and unequivocal evidence 
of an intent to abandon. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about March 13, 1981, Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corporation, hereinafter "Lucky Seven", filed suit against Pat 
Clark to quiet title to a 5.815 acre parcel of real property 
located on the borders of their respective properties in rural 
Washington County. (R. 1) At the time of trial, a dike and 
small reservoir were located on a portion of the acreage. For 
convenience, this parcel was referred to as the "dike area." 
After two days of trial the parties entered into a stipulation by 
which Lucky Seven was granted a perpetual easement to use the 
5.815 acre parcel. 
Lucky Seven appeals from a Summary Judgment entered by 
the Fifth Judicial District Court on January 23, 1986, termina-
ting the easement for alleged inappropriate use and abandonment 
of the easement property. (R. 220-222) 
The primary issue in this appeal is whether Lucky 
Seven's use of the easement property constitutes an abandonment 
or warrants a termination of the easement. 
A substantial portion of the trial testimony focused on 
the issue of Lucky Seven's historical use of the disputed 
property over the years of an alleged adverse possession. Russel 
J. Walter, president of Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation, testified 
that the 5.815 acre parcel had multiple uses. 
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Now, the portion of the ranch 
referred to generally as the "pond" 
and "dike" area, what did you use 
that for? 
The pond area and the dike area I 
used to store water to irrigate the 
fields on the south side of the 
pond, fruit trees and so forth, and 
I used it for pasture and water 
storage. . . • 
Now, while you are there, Mr. 
Walter, are there any improvements 
on that property that you placed 
there-you or your family placed 
there, that you were aware of? 
Yes. We decided a well right here 
where it went down -* when we bought 
the place, there was a well. It was 
down, I believe, like 150 feet, or 
something, and we drilled it on down 
right here (indicating) right on the 
dike and then we put in recreation 
area, basketball court here 
(indicating) then we done the 
smaller dike, pond work inside the 
big major pond. . . . 
Now, did you ever make any 
improvements on the pond area 
itself? 
Yes. 
And what did you do? 
We cleaned out the pond and built a 
smaller pond in the middle, and the 
well and the court. 
And what did you-
Then, of course, that fencing there 
too. We planted in there, we 
planted. 
I didn't hear you. 
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A. We planted, but it didn't grow very 
good. 
Q# With respect to animals, did you 
have animals inside that pond-dike 
area? 
A* Yes. 
(RT. 32:19-25; 33:9-19; 34:10-20; 38:2-23) 
Patricia Walter also testified regarding the use of the 
5.815 acre parcel. 
Q. Could you explain to the ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury and the Court 
what uses the pond and dike areas 
were put to during the period of 
r time that you lived there? 
A. Well, it was an area where we 
collected our irrigation water that 
came down a ditch from Central and 
it was a place we occasionally kept 
horses and some calves, sometimes. 
It was kind of a playground for the 
kids. Well, we had a boat on there 
and they played with the neighbor-
hood kids on the pond and we 
maintained the area like you 
would. We had a basketball court. . 
. . It was an area where we often 
kept livestock of different kinds, 
horses or cattle. I painted it and 
that's why it shows so good, because 
I painted it. Then a little bit to 
the south of the dike is where there 
is a basketball court, and we also 
had a volleyball net and badmitton, 
there is a horseshoe pit there and 
it was quite a gathering place for 
the neighbors ranch kids because 
there was a lot of things to do, a 
lot of fun. And we used the water, 
of course, to irrigate these fields 
and these orchards to the south and 
west of the pond area....we used 
this for so many different-
CRT. 119: 22-25; 120:1-4, 16-25; 121: 9-10). 
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When the respondent Pat Clark was asked whether he had 
observed the Appellant's use of the disputed parcel, he 
responded: "I never have, sir." (RT 208: 11-15). Otherwise, 
Mr. Clark gave no testimony regarding any past or future intended 
use of the disputed property. 
At trial, counsel for respondent Pat Clark attempted to 
minimize the frequency and importance of the appellant's use of 
the pond for irrigation purposes. For example, the cross-examin-
ation of Russel J. Walter proceeded as follows: 
Q. You testified, as I recall, on 
direct examination, that you used 
the water from this subject pond or 
reservoir to irrigate the ranch 
fields. Was that your testimony? 
A. . Yes. 
Q. Now it's true that a goodly share of 
the time the reservoir is dry, isn't 
it? 
A. A portion of the time it is dry. 
Q. And isn't it true that actually the 
reservoir is not the primary source 
of water to irrigate those fields, 
that you have other sources to 
irrigate them? 
A. At the time we purchased the ranch, 
it was the primary source. At the 
present time, it is not. 
Q. There are other sources of water 
there, aren't there? 
A. Yes. There are some. 
Q. And you don't necessarily rely upon 
water from the reservoir to irrigate * 
the ranch, do you? 
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A. Well, not entirely, no. 
(RT. 127:2-19) 
It is apparent from the following portion of the 
transcript of the trial that after hearing testimony regarding 
the multiple uses of the disputed property, the Court became 
increasingly disinterested in testimony regarding multiple uses 
of the disputed area, and discouraged additional testimony on use 
of the easement area. 
Mr. Anderson: Your Honor, I would offer in 
evidence what has been offered as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 31. 
The Court: What is the purpose of this, 
counsel? 
Mr. Anderson: Well, from another point of 
view, showing the utilization of the pond to 
the ranch. 
The Court: What does utilization of the pond 
probe? 
Mr. Anderson: Well, its use in relationship 
to the ranch. 
The Court: Well, there's no issue that it has 
use to the ranch, is there Mr. Foremaster? 
There is an issue as to who owns it, isn't 
that it? 
(RT. 46:6-18) 
It is clear from the record that Lucky Seven had made 
many uses of the property, including stock corralling, holding 
irrigation water, planting, and various recreational uses. There 
is no record that any one use was dependant, contingent or predi-
cated upon another use. 
10 
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On the third day of trial, the parties negotiated a 
> 
settlement. The parties1 oral stipulation was reduced to writing 
and signed by the parties and their counsel. (R. 152-155) 
Counsel submitted the form of an Order and Judgment consistent 
with the oral and written stipulation which was signed by the 
District Court Judge on February 13, 1984. (R. 156) 
Paragraph three (3) of the Order and Judgement entered 
by the District Court states that Lucky Seven is to have 
an exclusive and perpetual easement to use, 
maintain and operate the reservoir and dike 
are [sic] which are described in paragraph 2 
above for irrigation, stock watering, corrall-
ing of animals and agricultural purposes, 
together with the obligation that plaintiff 
shall maintain the fences enclosing the area 
hereinabove described. (R 157, 1f 3) 
Paragraph five (5) of the Court's Order and Judgment 
grants Lucky Seven an easement across the Defendant's land for a 
"ditch" presently running from the town of Central to the reser-
voir. Lucky Seven was further granted the right to improve said 
ditch by installation of a pipeline and all necessary rights of 
ingress and egress to maintain the same. (R. 157, fl 5) 
In Paragraph 6 of the Order and Judgment, the parties 
provided for termination of the easement as follows: 
In the event the reservoir and dike area 
described in paragraph 2 above were to fall 
into non-use for a period of ten (10) consecu-
tive years, the easement granted in paragraph 
3 above would expire automatically without 
notice. (R. 158, 1f 6) 
11 
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In 1985, Lucky Seven removed from the easement a portion 
of a dike located on the property, and began to level the ground 
in preparation for planting. (R. 188, 1f 8) 
The fee owner, Pat Clark, filed a motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 180) Pat Clark filed an affidavit in support of 
Summary Judgment, alleging that the purpose of the easement was 
to use and maintain a dike and reservoir and that Lucky Seven's 
voluntary removal of the reservoir and dike in 1985 destroyed the 
need and purpose for the easement, thus, destroying the easement 
itself. (R. 182-184) 
Lucky Seven responded by filing the affidavit of its 
president, Russel J. Walter, who testified that he understood and 
intended that the easement granted alternative uses of the 5.815 
acre parcel, including "agricultural purposes." Russel Walter's 
affidavit further stated that Lucky Seven had elected to use the 
easement for agricultural purposes, rather than a reservoir and 
dike. (R. 188, U 11) Walter denied any intent to abandon the 
easement and stated that he believed that Lucky Seven's removal 
of the dike and reservoir for agricultural purposes was consis-
tent with the language of the easement and intent of the parties. 
(R. 188, 1[ 11) 
Russel Walter's Affidavit states that at the time of 
entering into a consent Judgment providing for alternative uses 
of the 5.815 acre parcel, the parties "were aware and intended" 
that upon installation of the pipeline replacing the ditch, and 
that Lucky Seven had no obligation to continue using its water to 
'12 
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fill a pond. Lucky Seven also alleged that a portion of the dike 
was located on Lucky Seven's separate property and that Lucky 
Seven had determined to remove that portion of the dike on its 
property, thus creating a breach in the dike and making that 
portion of the dike located on the easement property useless for 
holding water. (R. 187/ 1f 7; 188/ H 12) 
The District Court heard oral argument on Pat Clark's 
motion for Summary Judgment on the 13th day of November/ 1985. 
The Court stated that it was his "direct impression that the 
purpose of the lawsuit with respect to the area was for a reser-
voir and dike/" and ordered that the removal of the dike 
destroyed the easement and directed that a Summary Judgment be 
prepared. (TH Nov. 13, 1985/ P. 2: 18-20) 
Counsel for Pat Clark submitted a proposed Summary Judg-
ment to which Lucky Seven filed objections and requested find-
ings. (R. 203-206; R. 207-209) One of Lucky Seven's objections 
was- that at the hearing on November 13f 1985/ the trial court had 
stated that its ruling was based/ at least in part, on some ambi-
guity in the Judgment of February/ 1984. The proposed Summary 
Judgment, however, failed to specify the nature of the ambiguity. 
(R. 107/ 1[ .1) 
At a hearing on December 10, 1985f counsel for Lucky 
Seven objected to the proposed Summary Judgment in part because 
the proposed Order failed to clarify what ambiguity was in the 
13 
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February, 1984 Order and Judgment. (TH Dec, 10, 1985, P.4:9-21; 
P.5:11-20) 1 
On Lucky Seven's request to identify the ambiguous 
language, the Court ordered that paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the 
original Order of February 13, 1984, be included in the Summary 
It is unclear what ambiguity the Court had in mind. 
However, it is possible that a typographical error may have 
caused a potential ambiguity. Paragraph 3 of the Order and 
Judgment states: 
Plaintiff Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation and 
its successors and assigns (hereinafter 
"plaintiff") shall have an exclusive and 
perpetual easement to use, maintain and 
operate the reservoir and dyke are which are 
described in paragraph 2 above . . . 
(R. 157, emphasis added) r • 
The word "are" should have been "area". This typograph-
ical error may give an impression that Plaintiff was to maintain 
the dike and reservoir, rather than the "dike and reservoir 
area". The phrase "reservoir and dike area" is a short hand way 
of describing the 5.815 acre parcel. This potential ambiguity, 
however, is clarified by comparing the same phrase in paragraphs 
2 and 6 of the same Order and Judgment, which clearly refer to 
the larger 5.815 acre parcel. Similarly, the Stipulation upon 
which the Order and Judgment was based consistently refers to 
maintaining the "reservoir and dyke area" for agricultural and 
other purposes. (R. 152, fll; 153, fl2; 154, «[5) 
Lucky Seven requested findings. Lucky Seven requested 
that the Court identify the ambiguity, and questioned whether the 
trial court understood that the easement covered an area substan-
tially larger than the reservoir and dike and that the words to 
"maintain the reservoir and dyke are", really meant maintain the 
reservoir and dike area, which was much larger than the reservoir 
and did not imply keeping the reservoir intact. (R. 207, 11 1; 
208, fl 6,7) 
The Court corrected the potential ambiguity and stated 
that he understood that the reservoir and dike did not cover the 
entire 5.8 acres, but that the easement area was larger than the 
reservoir and dike. (TH. Dec.10, 1985, P.16:4-18) 
14 
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Judgment because these paragraphs ostensibly created an 
ambiguity. (TH Dec. 10, 1985, P.5:11-20). 
At this same hearing on December 10, 1985, the District 
Court explained his understanding of the February, 1984 Order and 
Judgment. 
It was my understanding that the settlement 
was based upon the use of a reservoir and dike 
for certain property legally in the name of 
the defendant, Pat Clark. 
So long as the reservoir and dike were to 
continue in use-it being already in place-the 
easement would continue. I thought that's 
what you agreed, but that the legal title 
would remain in the name of the defendant. 
It was my understanding at that time at the 
time of the Summary Judgment and today, that 
the reservoir and the dike, having been 
removed, the easement use purpose was extin-
guished and the legal owner should again have 
the property. 
(TH Dec.10, 1985, P.12:1-13) 
Further clarifying the Court's position, the Court said: 
"The court does understand and found, and I 
understood the thrust of the lawsuit to be, 
that 5.8 acres and the easement was predicated 
on there being a dike and reservoir there. 
The Court finds that the sole purpose of the 
reservoir and dike, or the easement for the 
remainder, outside the exact area encompassed 
by the reservoir and dike was predicated upon 
there being a reservoir and dike there. 
(TH Dec.10, 1985, P.16:7-12, 19:10-14). 
The Court entered Summary Judgment and ordered that the 
easement was abandoned and terminated. Explaining his reasoning, 
15 
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the Court stated: 
The Court being of the opinion that the reason 
plaintiff was granted such easement under the 
parties1 stipulation upon said real property 
was to operate and maintain said reservoir and 
dike for the benefit of the abutting agricul-
tural property owned by and used by the plain-
tiff and for that purpose only and the reason 
for the parties1 stipulation regarding said 
easement was to provide said use and benefit 
to abutting property, and the Court hereby 
finding that the grant of said easement was 
for the sole reason to enable the plaintiff to 
use and maintain the reservoir and dike. 
The Court found that the sole reason and pur-
pose for the easement was to operate the 
reservoir and dike and when these purposes 
were destroyed, the plaintiff's right to use 
and maintain the reservoir and dike thereon 
for any other purpose expressed therein is 
hereby terminated. 
(R. 222-223) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On the third day of trial to quiet title, the parties 
stipulated that Lucky Seven be granted a perpetual easement to 
use a 5.815 acre parcel of property. This parcel had histori-
cally been used by Lucky Seven for many things, including plant-
ing and agricultural purposes. The trial court entered its 
consent Order and Judgment, which described several uses, includ-
ing "agricultural purposes". 
Lucky Seven argues that the trial court's Summary Judg-
ment that the easement was terminated and abandoned by Lucky 
Seven's removal of a dike on the property and leveling the ground 
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in preparation for planting, an agricultural purpose, is contrary 
to the clear language of the Stipulation and Order and Judgment. 
The trial court found that the "sole purpose" of grant-
ing the easement was to enable Lucky Seven to maintain and 
operate a dike and reservoir for the benefit of Lucky Seven's 
abutting property, and that continued use of the properry as a 
dike and reservoir was a necessary "precedent" to any other use 
such as an agricultural use. 
The trial court's construction of the Order and Judgment 
is erroneous. Lucky Seven argues that there is no support in the 
record for the trial court's erroneous "sole purpose" theory of 
the intent of the parties. The idea that maintenance of a dike 
was a condition precedent to alternative uses is not found in the 
record. Further, Lucky Seven argues that the trial court was 
without power to construe an unambiguous Order and Judgment. 
Lucky Seven argues that the Order and Judgment entered 
by consent is akin to a contract and the Court had no discretion 
to alter the contract or agreement of the parties by construc-
tion. 
The Affidavits in support and in oposition to Summary 
Judgment indicate a clear factual dispute about the intent of the 
parties regarding use of the easement. Lucky Seven's Affidavit 
states that the parties knew and understood that the need for a 
reservoir on the property would be eliminated by construction of 
a pressurized irrigation pipeline. The parties, therefore, 
agreed to alternative and multiple uses of the property, includ-
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ing agricultural purposes. It was not intended that the dike and 
reservoir remain on the property. 
Pat Clark's Affidavitf on the other hand, states that 
the parties intended that the easement was granted only to allow 
Lucky Seven to maintain the dike and reservoir to benefit abutt-
ing property. When this purpose was removed, the purpose of the 
easement was destroyed. 
Lucky Seven believes that where the intents of the par-
ties are in such clear dispute, the trial court erred in granting 
Summary Judgment. The trial court's resort to his unsupported 
recollections of the intents of the parties to resolve the dis-
puted factual issue was also error. 
It is undisputed that Lucky Seven removed a dike on the 
property and leveled the property in preparation for planting. 
Except for the language of the Order and Judgment allowing "agri-
cultural" use of the easement, an intent to destroy the easement 
might be inferred from this conduct. In view of the "agricul-
tural" uses allowed by the Order and Judgment, however, it may be 
inferred that Lucky Seven intended to use the property consistent 
with the Order and Agreement of the parties. Of great signifi-
cance is the fact that the Order and Judgment contain no language 
of condition that would indicate that an agricultural use was 
conditioned on continued use of the reservoir. The trial court 
failed to resolve these inferences in a light most favorable to 
Lucky Seven and erroneously entered Summary Judgment. 
The trial court found that Lucky Seven had abandoned the 
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easement. In Utah law abandonment of an easement must be shown 
by clear and unequivocal evidence of an intent to abandon the 
easement. Since the Order and Judgment clearly states that the 
property could be used for agricultural purposes, and the pro-
perty had, in fact, been used for planting in the past, there is 
no unequivocal evidence of an intent to abandon by Lucky Seven's 
conduct in determining to plant the area, thus selecting one of 
the permitted uses over another permitted use. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE CLEAR PROVISIONS OF THE STIPULATION AND 
CONSENT JUDGMENT ALLOWING ALTERNATIVE USES 
OF THE EASEMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN EFFECT AND 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT REVERSED. 
The Order and Judgment entered February 13, 1984, states 
in pertinent part: 
Plaintiff, Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation, and 
its successors and assigns (hereinafter 
"plaintiff") shall have an exclusive and per-
petual easement to use, maintain and operate 
the reservoir and dike are [sic] which are 
described in paragraph 2 above for irrigation, 
stock watering, corralling of animals and 
agricultural purposes, together with the" 
obligation that the plaintiff shall maintain 
the fences enclosing the area hereinafter 
described. (R. 157, <[ 3) 
There is no dispute that in 1985 the Appellant removed a 
dike which was located on a portion of easement property and 
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began to prepare the reservoir area for planting. Lucky Seven 
urges that this admitted conduct is not contrary to the clear and 
unambiguous provisions of the stipulation of the parties and the 
consent Order and Judgment. 
Paragraph three (3) of the Court's Order clearly and 
unambiguously provides alternative uses for the 5.815 acre ease-
ment , including "agricultural purposes". The language of the 
Order and Judgment does not suggest any single use, reason, or 
purpose for the easement or any portion thereof. Nor does the 
Order suggest that some uses are predicated or conditional on 
continuation of other uses. The language of the Order does not 
suggest that any use of the entire easement or any portion there-
of is of any primary or secondary importance. 
In spite of the clear language of the Order and Judgment 
the District Court found, "that the grant of said easement was 
for the sole reason to enable the plaintiff to use and maintain 
the reservoir and dike;" (R. 223) Amplifying this idea, the 
Court said that the use of the 5.85 acres "for agricultural 
purposes" was "predicated" on there being a reservoir and dike 
there. (TH, Dec. 10, 1985, 16:8-12). In other words, the 
property must be used as a reservoir only. 
This Court should give effect to the clear provisions of 
the Order and Judgment. Park City Utah Corporation v. Ensign 
Company, 586 P.2d 446 (Utah 1978); Westbrook v. Lea General 
Hospital, 85 N.M. 191, 510 P.2d 515 (N.M. App. 1973). This rule 
is particularly appropriate in the instant case where the lower 
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court entered the consent Judgment pursuant to the stipulation of 
the parties. In Payton v. Magleby, 30 Utah 2d 236, 516 P.2d 344 
(1973), this Court held that a consent judgment given pursuant to 
a stipulation is presumed to be correct in the absence of a 
showing to the contrary. A consent judgment, therefore, is a 
contract between the parties, and the Court should give effect to 
the clear language selected by those parties. Parks v. Parks, 91 
N.M. 369, 574 P.2d 588 (1978); Bean v. Carlos, 21 Utah 2d 309, 
445 P.2d (Utah 1968); Owen v. Burn Construction Company, 563 P.2d 
91 (N.M. 1977); State Highway Commission v. B. J. Clark, 439 P.2d 
537 (N.M. 1968). 
The clear provisions of the Order and Judgment simply do 
not support the lower court's "sole reason" theory, nor is there 
any support in the Order and Judgment, or in the entire record, 
for the proposition that agricultural uses were predicated on 
continued use as a reservoir only. The clear language of the 
consent Judgment to which the parties agreed was that there be 
alternative or multiple uses of the easement. There is no 
language of condition. The Summary Judgment cannot be upheld 
without ignoring or rejecting the clear provisions of the stipu-
lation and consent Judgment. 
This Court should reverse the Summary Judgment and 
direct the District Court to enter an order allowing agricultural 
uses of the property giving effect to the Stipulation and Order 
and Judgment. 
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ARGUMENT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING 
THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT. 
The respondent, Pat Clark, filed a motion requesting the 
District Court to interpret the Order and Judgment of February, 
1984. (R. 171) The District Court undertook to construe the 
Order and Judgment and thereafter entered its motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 222) Lucky Seven urges that the trial court 
erred in construing the Order and Judgment. 
A 
THE LOWER COURT HAD NO POWER TO CONSTRUE 
AN UNAMBIGUOUS JUDGMENT, 
As a general rule, the District Court has inherent power 
to construe its Judgments. However, this power does not extend 
to an unambiguous Judgment. Where a Judgment is unambiguous, the 
Court may not construe it. The Judgment must be enforced as it 
speaks. Park City Utah Corporation v. Ensign Company, Supra; 
Kishner v. Kishner, 562 P.2d 493 (Nev. 1977); Spomer v. Spomer, 
580 P.2c3 1146 (Wyo. 1978); Wells v. Valley National Bank of 
Arizona, 109 Ariz. 345, 509 P.2d 615 (Ariz. 1973). 
Although Pat Clark requested the District Court to 
construe or interpret the Order and Judgment, he identified no 
ambiguity in the written Judgment. The District Court initially 
indicated that there was some unspecified ambiguity in the 
consent Judgment but failed to identify the ambiguity. Lucky 
Seven requested that the Court identify any ambiguity in the 
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Order and Judgment. (R. 207) At a hearing on December 10, 1985, 
the Court identified paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Order and 
Judgment as containing some ambiguity, however, the nature of the. 
ambiguity was never articulated. (TH., Dec.10, 1985, P.4:9-21) 
In the absence of a finding of ambiguity, this Court 
should proceed as if. the Order and Judgment is not ambiguous and 
reverse the District Court's Summary Judgment based on the 
Court's erroneous construction of the unambiguous language of the 
Order and Judgment which allows agricultural use of the property. 
The District Court could not construe an unambiguous Order and 
Judgment. 
B 
THK TRIAL COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, 
The Trial Court construed the Order and Judgment to mean 
that agricultural purposes were "predicated" on there being a 
reservoir and dike on the property, and further, that the "sole 
purpose" of the easement was to allow Lucky Seven to maintain 
reservoir and dike to benefit adjacent property. (TH., Dec.10, 
1985, P.16:8-12) 
This Court in Park City Utah Corporation v. Ensign 
Company, Supra. , stated that if the meaning of a judgment is 
obscure or ambiguous the entire record may be resorted to for the 
purpose of construing the judgment. Even if the Order and 
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Judgment in this case were ambiguous, opening the door for 
judicial construction, the Court's construction of the Order and 
Judgment is wholly without support in the record. While there is 
support in the record that a portion of the easement property had 
historically been used on occasion for a dike and reservoir, 
there is no indication that this use was to be a predicate or 
condition to other uses or that the parties intended that this 
use necessarily be continued. In fact, there is evidence that 
the parties undertstood that there were other sources of water to 
irrigate the fields, that the parties understood that a 
pressurized irrigation pipeline would be installed, thus 
eliminating the need for the reservoir, but not terminating the 
easement. (R.154, 1f 5; 157, M 5) 
The Court in Parks v. Parks, Supra., held that stipula-
tions must be construed to give effect to the intent of the 
parties, and in seeking the intent of the parties the language 
used will be not construed so as to give the effect of a waiver 
of a right not plainly intended to be relinquished. The trial 
court's construction of the Order and Judgment would waive Lucky 
Seven's right to elect* alternative uses of the property and 
require it to continue to use the dike and reservoir. Since this 
is plainly not intended as no language of condition is employed 
in the Stipulation, this construction is erroneous. 
Simply stated, the Court's construction of the easement 
which cannot be supported by the record, and would work a waiver 
on Lucky Seven, cannot be upheld. 
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c 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO DISCRETION 
OR AUTHORITY TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
CONSENT JUDGMENT. 
As earlier expressed, a stipulated Judgment is not a 
judicial determination, but rather, it is a contract between the 
parties. (Payton v. Magleby, Supra.) As such, a consent 
judgment is not within the power or discretion of the Court to 
amend or alter by construction or interpretation. The Court must 
enforce the contract which the parties made. Owenv. Burn 
Construction Company, Supra. 
If the Court had found an ambiguity in the consent 
judgment, it would have been justified in judicially interpreting 
or construing the judgment, with the aid of the record. The 
Court's subjective understandings, beliefs, or intents, however, 
are wholly irrelevant since the Court was not a party to the con-
tract. 
The District Court in the case at Bar did not consider 
the language of the stipulation or the record in construing the 
consent Judgment. Rather, the Court relied on its own recollec-
tion of the lawsuit, and without the aid of the record, made 
findings based on that recollection rather than on the record. 
The District Court stated: 
The Court finds that the sole purpose of the 
reservoir and dike, or the easement for the 
remainder, outside the exact area encompassed 
by the reservoir and dike, was predicated upon 
their being a reservoir and dike there, and 
that the area included in the easement is 
larger than the area encompassing the reser-
voir and dike. (TH., Dec. 10, 1985, P.19.) 
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No support for this "sole purpose" theory or the Court's 
"predicate" theory can be found in the record. While this may be 
the Court's understanding of the purposes of the easement, there 
is no evidence that this was the intent or the agreement of the 
parties, and the Court's understanding is irrelevant. 
If the parties intended that the easement would termi-
nate for non-use of the reservoir and dike, they could easily 
have said as much. Rather, the parties agreed that the easement 
would terminate if the "reservoir and dike area fell into disuse 
for a period of 10 years". (It is important to note here that 
the entire 5.815 acre parcel, only a portion of which had been 
used as a dike and reservoir, was referred to for convenience as 
the "reservoir and dike area".) The parties clearly contemplated 
and provided for a termination as a result of total non-use of 
the area, but said nothing about termination resulting from a 
cessation of a particular use of the area. 
The District Court, in construing the consent Order and 
Judgment, apparently assumed that this Judgment, like other non-
consent judgments, could be clarified, altered, or tinkered with 
until the Judgment was consistent with judicial intent. A 
consent judgment, however, is fundamentally different. As stated 
before, it is a contract, and as such the Court's intents and 
understanding are irrelevant since the Court is not a party to 
the contract. The Court is not entitled to alter or amend a 
consent judgment and fashion a new agreement to which the parties 
did not agree, particularly by relying on its own feelings, 
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recollections, or understanding of other matters, dehors the 
record. The Court's intrusion into the contract of the parties 
in this matter is beyond the power and discretion of the Court 
and the Summary Judgment must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF ROSSEL J. WALTER RAISES 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT, THUS PRECLUDING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
It is admitted that a dike was removed from the easement 
premises. However, the understandings, intentions, and conse-
quences of this fact are vigorously disputed, therefore, this 
matter could not be properly resolved by Summary Judgment. 
Sandberg v, Klein, 576 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1978). -.-
The Trial Court entered Summary Judgment because, 
according to the Court, the parties intended that the easement 
was granted for the sole" reason to enable the Plaintiff to use 
and maintain the reservoir and dike. The maintenance of the 
reservoir and dike was a condition precedent or prerequisite to 
other uses. According the Court, the removal of the dike and 
reservoir eliminated the intended use and purpose of the ease-
ment. (R. 220-223) The supposed intent of the parties regarding 
the purposes and uses of the easement was the central factual 
question on Summary Judgment. 
The intentions of the parties regarding the use of the 
easement were placed squarely in dispute by the Affidavits of the 
parties. The.Affidavit of Pat Clark in support of his motion for 
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Summary Judgment indicates that the intention and purpose of the 
easement was to maintain the dike and reservoir. Clark's Affi-
davit states: ; 
3. That Plaintiff has either caused to be 
removed or has itself removed or allowed to be 
removed from the real estate described in said 
Order, the above mentioned reservoir and dike 
for which said easement was granted, and the 
same no longer exists and the said real estate 
has been leveled and is presently being unused 
as far as your Affiant can determine. 
4. That said reservoir and dike have been 
completely destroyed and removed from the 
property, and because of the same, said 
property can no longer be used for the 
purposes set forth in said easement, and as 
above set forth and described. 
5. That because of the same the said 
Plaintiff has, in effect, abandoned and for-
feited said easement and has destroyed the 
reason for said easement to exist. 
6. That because of said acts of the Plaintiff 
as aforesaid, the reason for grant of said 
easement no longer exists. 
(R. 183, emphasis added) 
In his Affidavit in opposition to the motion for Summary 
Judgment, Lucky Seven's President, Russel J. Walter, disputed 
Clark's assertions that the intent, purpose and reason for the 
easement was to require maintaining the dike and reservoir. 
Lucky Seven alleged that the intent was to grant alternative 
uses. Walter's Affidavit states as follows: 
6. That the Defendant was aware that a 
portion of the dike was located on the 
Plaintiff's property and would be removed. 
When the necessity for the reservoir was 
obviated by the construction of a pipeline. 
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9, The easement was granted for several 
alternative purposes and uses, including irri-
gation and stock watering, corralling of 
animals and agrigultural purposes. Plaintiff 
has elected to use the easement at the present 
time for agricultural purposes. 
10. The easement does not require the 
property to be used for a reservoir or dike, 
but grants the Plaintiff an election of alter-
natives. 
(R. 187, 188, emphasis added) 
Comparing the two Affidavits, it is clear that Clark 
claims that the purpose and intent of the easement was to operate 
a reservoir and dike, while Lucky Seven averes that the intention 
of the parties was to allow several alternative uses of the ease-
ment, not LHjuiiing its use as a reservoir and dike. The inten-
tions of the parties are clearly disputed. The Affidavits raise 
an issue of fact, thus making Summary Judgment inappropriate as a 
matter of law. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982). 
The Kansas Supreme Court in Bowen v. W. H. Westerhaus, 
224 Kan. 42, 578 P.2d 1102 (1978) held that courts should be 
cautious in granting summary judgment when resolution of a 
dispositive issue necessitates a determination of the state of 
mind of one or both of the parties. 
At hearing on Summary Judgment this factual dispute was 
emphasized. The District Court erroneously resorted to its own 
opinion of the intentions and state of mind of the parties to 
resolve this issue of fact. The Court said: 
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It was my understanding that the settlement 
was based upon the use of a reservoir and dike 
for certain property legally in the name of 
the Defendant Pat Clark. 
So long as the reservoir and dike were to 
continue in use - it being already in place -
the easement would continue. I thought that's 
what you agreed, but that the legal title 
would remain in the name of the Defendant. 
(TH., Dec. 10, 1985, P.12). 
Before granting Summary Judgment, the Court was aware 
that the alleged intentions of the parties with regard to the use 
of the reservoir and dike were in dispute by their Affidavits. 
The Court, nevertheless, relied upon his own recollection to 
resolve the factual dispute of the state of the minds of the 
parties on Summary Judgment. If extrinsic evidence, even if it 
be the Court's own recollections, is necessary to clear up an 
ambiguity, Summary Judgment should not be entered. Mobile Acres, 
Inc. v. Kurata, 508 P.2d, 889 (Kan. 1973). The District Court 
erred in resolving a dispute regarding a material fact by 
resorting to his own understanding and recollections. Summary 
Judgment must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT IV 
SUPPOSED AMBIGUITIES IN ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
COULD NOT LAWFULLY BE RESOLVED BY 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
While Lucky Seven does not believe the original Order 
and Judgment was ambiguous regarding the alternative uses of the 
easement, nevertheless, the Court indicated there may have been 
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some ambiguity. The Court, however, declined to specify the 
nature of the ambiguity. In the event that this Court determines 
that the Order and Judgment is indeed ambiguous, Lucky Seven 
posits the proposition of law that Summary lodgment is an inap-
propriate way to dispose of an ambiguity. This Court held in 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983), that where a 
written contract was determined to be ambiguous, a motion for 
Summary Judgment may not be granted if the evidence shows an 
issue of fact regarding what the parties intended. W.M. Barnes 
Co, v. Ohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981); Grow 
v. Marwick Development Inc., 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1980); Amjacs 
Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981); 
Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corp., 
590 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1979); Lynch v. Spillman, 62 Cal. Rptr. 12, 
431 P.2d 636, (Cal. 1967); Hamada v. Valley National Bank, 27 
Ariz. App. 433, 555 P.2d 1121 (1976); Washington Hydroculture, 
Inc. v. Payne, 96 Wash. 2d 322, 635 P.2d 138 (1981). 
This general rule applies to judgments on stipulation as 
well as <;; tracts and documents. The Supreme Court in Park City 
Utah Corp; v. Ensign Co., Supra, stated that "an ambiguous judg-
ment on stipulation is subject to all the rules that apply to 
written instruments." Pennington v. Employer's Liability 
Assurance Corp., 520 P.2d 96 (Alaska 1974). The application of 
the general rule above-stated in the present case is particularly 
appropriate where the parties stipulated and consented to the 
Judgment. This consent Judgment should be viewed and treated as 
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a contract between the parties. (Payton v. Magleby, Supra.) If 
there is an ambiguity in the writing and the intentions of the 
parties are disputed, Summary Judgment is inappropriate. 
ARGUMENT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
CONSIDER THE REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM 
THE ADMITTED FACTS IN A LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO LUCKY SEVEN. 
When ruling on a motion for Summary Judgment, a trial 
court should consider all conflicting inferences arising from 
admitted facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Hustead v. 
Bendix Corp. , 233 Kan. 870, 666 P.2d 1175 (1983); Southside 
Tabernacle v. Pentecostal Church of God, Pacific Northwest 
District, Inc.,, 32 Wash. App. 814, 650 P.2d 231 (1982); 
Goodpaster v. Pfizer, Inc. , 35 Wash. App. 199, 665 P.2d 414 
(1983); Bowen v. W. H. Westerhaus, Supra.; State of Arizona v. 
Ashton Co., Inc., 4 Ariz. App. 599, 422 P.2d 727 (1967); Weaver 
v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, 609 P.2d 984 (Wyo. 1980). 
In the instant case, the easement states that the ease-
ment area may be used for "irrigation, stockwatering, corralling 
of animals and agricultural purposes". (R. 157, If 3) The record 
indicates a history of multiple uses of this property. The Affi-
davit of Russel J. Walter states his understanding that there 
were "alternative uses" of the easement property. (R. 188, <[ 9) 
The Affidavit also indicates that the parties understood and 
agreed that the dike and reservoir would ultimately be removed 
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when Lucky Seven installed the pressurized irrigation system, 
> 
thus giving an additional reason for the stated alternative uses 
of the easement property. (R. 187, 1[ 5) In light of these under-
standings and intents, as well as the : t^: -:y of multiple uses of 
the property, the Appellant admittedly removed the dike and 
reservoir and began preparing the easement for agricultural use. 
The admitted facts raise conflicting inferences. It can 
be inferred from these facts that Lucky Seven reasonably believed 
that it could elect an alternative use of the property and remove 
the dike without injuring or abandoning the easement, and there-
fore, did not have the requisite intent to abandon the easement. 
When the conflicting inferences raised by the admitted facts are 
properly viewed in a light most favorable to Lucky Seven, it 
becomes clear that the District Court should have determined for 
purposes of Summary Judgment that there was no clear or unequivo-
cal intent to abandon the easement as required by law, and 
Summary Judgment should have been denied. 
ARGUMENT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT 
ABANDONED THE EASEMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
ANY CLEAR OR UNEQUIVOCAL EVIDENCE OF 
AN INTENT TO ABANDON. 
This Court in Timpanogas Highland, Inc. v. Harper, 544 
P. 2d 481 (Utah 1975), stated that an abandonment must be proved 
by clear and unequivocal evidence of an intentional relinquish-
ment of a right. Thermo-Kinetic, Inc., v. Allen, 16 Ariz. App. 
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341, 493 P.2d 508 (1972). In the instant case, there is no direct 
or express evidence of an intent to abandon the easement. In 
fact, Lucky Seven expressly denied any intent to do so. (R. 188, 
11 11) Thus, any evidence of the Appellant's intent to abandon 
the easement must be inferred from the circumstances and the 
Appellant's conduct. 
In the present case, Lucky Seven's conduct is consistent 
with the intent to elect an alternative use of the property as 
permitted by the literal language of the easement. Therefore, 
the Appellant's conduct in removing the reservoir and dike stand-
ing alone is not unequivocal evidence of an intent to abandon. 
There is simply insufficient evidence to support the finding of 
abandonment.
 v 
The District Court purported to interpret and construe 
the consent Order and Judgment. As previously stated, a District 
Court may not construe an order or judgment unless said judgment 
or order is ambiguous. Having interpreted or construed an uni-
dentified and unarticulated ambiguity in the Order and Judgment, 
the District Court set about to punish Lucky Seven for failing to 
properly construe the ambiguity and act in accordance with the 
proper construction thereof. It is difficult to understand how a 
party can formulate an intent to abandon an easement when the 
easement had to be interpreted and construed by the trial court 
to establish which uses were permitted and which were not. It 
seems equitable that if a provision of an easement or judgment is 
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capable of two meanings and a party, before a judicial 
construction or interpretation of the ambiguity, conducts itself 
consistent with one of the possible meanings, that no intent to 
relinquish a
 r£ght or abandon should be inferred from, said 
conduct. Under these circumstances, if the Court properly found 
Lucky Seven's earlier conduct to be contrary to the clarified 
Judgment, the appropriate relief was to issue an injunction or to 
award damages, if appropriate. A finding of abandonment, 
however, is wholly inappropriate and inequitable. 
CONCLUSION 
The conduct, of; Lucky Seven in removing the dike and 
preparing the easement for planting is an appropriate use of the 
easement property. This Court should make a denovo review of the 
language of the easement and determine that Lucky Seven's conduct 
was appropriate. The Summary Judgment should be reversed, and an 
opinion entered that Lucky Seven's conduct was proper pursuant to 
the clear language of the easement. 
In the event that this Court finds an ambiguity in the 
Stipulation of the parties or the Order and Judgment, which con-
stitutes the easement, then this Court should reverse the Summary 
Judgment finding that the trial court's construction is erroneous 
and remanding the matter to District Court, with instructions to 
set the matter for trial on the issue of the intent of the 
parties regarding use of the easement. 
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In the event this Court determines that the Order and 
Judgment was ambiguous but should be construed against Lucky 
Seven, then this Court should reverse Summary Judgment for the 
reason that there is no unequivocal evidence of an intent to 
abandon the easement, and remand to the District Court for trial 
on the issue of Lucky Seven's breach of the easement and damages. 
Respectfully submitted, November 4, 1986. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Timothy -ST. Anderson 
Dale K'. Chamberlain 
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ifTH JUDICIAL i,iS7 COij,lT 
WASHINGTON »;CU?iTY 
•24„ ^ i^^iU^-juTssr jicrj^y 
| 1 FEB 13 1984 |j \ 
£ _ 
sr-zam.:," Timothy B. Anderson of 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOOGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
One South Main, Suite 300 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801) 628-1627 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
DEPUTY 
LUCKY SEVEN RODEO CORPORATION 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STIPULATION AND 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Civil No. 7917 
PAT CLARK, an individual, 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
The parties above named appeared before the above 
entitled Court for Jury Trial on the 14th, 15th, and 16th days of 
December, 1983 at the Washington County Hall of Justice and on 
December 16, 1983 entered into a Stipulation and Settlement of 
all issues in the above numbered case as follows: 
1. Title to the reservoir and dike area shall remain in 
the name of Pat (Chas.) R. Clark and Tex Gates. Said parcel 
comprises that area used by Plaintiff Lucky Seven Ranch within 
the fence lines and within the NW1/4 NW1/4 Sec. 28, T39S, R16W 
and more specifically described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of the Northwest 
1/4 of the Northwest 1/4 of Section 28, Township 39 
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South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
said point being S 0° 36* W 1299.425 feet along the 
Section line from the Northwest Corner of said 
Section 28 and running thence N 0° 36 f E 339.00 
feet to a point on an old fence line; thence along 
an old fence line as follows: N 79° 21' 30" E 
543.00 feet; thence S 82° 30 f E 30.01 feet; thence 
S 18° 50' E 261.00 feet; thence S 7° 40' SO11 E 
200.00 feet to a point on the South line of the 
Northwest 1/4 of said Section 28; thence leaving 
said old fence line and running N 89° 09' 50" W 
678.00 feet along the 1/16 line to the point of 
beginning. 
Containing 5.815 Acres. 
2. Plaintiff Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation and its 
successors and assigns (hei:e 1 i ta fter "P] a i n11ff") sha 1 1 have an 
exclusive and perpetual easement to us**,, maintain and operate the 
reservoir and dike area which are described in paragraph 1 above 
for- irrigation, stock watering, corralling of animals and 
agricultural purposes, together with the obligation that 
plaintiff shall maintain the fences enclosing the area 
hereinabove described. 
3. In the event defendant is assessed a tax increase as 
a result of plaintiff's maintainance or improvement of the 
property described in paragra~ u ' abovf",, plaintiff shal 1 
reimburse defendant the amount c; said increased assessment 
within thirty (30) days written notice of payment thereof. 
4. Defendant grants to platntifr an easement for 
plaintiff's ditch presently running from the town of Central to 
the reservoir wherever said ditch runs across defendant's land, 
and plaintiff further shall have right to improve said ditch by 
- 2 -
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installation of a pipeline and have all necessary rights of 
ingress and egress to maintain the same. 
5. In the event the reservoir and dike area described 
in paragraph 1 above were to fall into non-use for a period of 
ten (10) consecutive years, the easement granted in paragraph 2 
above would expire with thirty (30) days written notice. 
6. In the event the ditch described in paragraph 4 
above were to fall into non-use for a period of twenty (20) 
consecutive years, the easement granted herein would expire with 
thirty (30) days written notice. 
7. The public, including plaintiff, shall have a 
perpetual and continuous easement for use of the present roadway 
across SE1/4 NW1/4 Sec. 28, T39S, R16W, which consists of the 
present access roads to the Brookside Estates Subdivision and 
Brookside Summer Homes. 
8. An easement serving as the access road to the Lucky 
Seven Ranch would continue to exist along the lines of the 
present road from highway U-18 to the Lucky Seven Ranch, said 
road being located in NW1/4 NW1/4 Sec. 28 T39S, R16W. 
9. Plaintiff shall immediately transfer to defendant 
underground water rights in an amount sufficient to serve 
culinary water to three (3) homes, with the exact amount to be 
determined according to State Division of Water Resources 
published standards. Defendant shall make use of said water by 
- 3 -
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drilling his own well or create his own point of diversion and 
shall not be entitled to use of the wel 1 on plaintiff fs property 
o! wi th 11: 1 th< s easeiiiei: it: , ai: "ea desc i: i bed in par ag r aph 1 above . If 
Defendant fai Is to pi it the water rights transfered hereunder to 
beneficial use within a period of five (5) years from the dat-
h e i: e o f , s a i d i: I g h t s s h a 1 I a u f • i •> m a 11 c a ] ] y without notice, levert to 
plaintiff. 
10. Parties hereby dismiss any and all claims arising 
b y v i i: t ii e o f t h i s a c t ion one a g a i n s t t h e o t h e • i : , 
DATED this 6(9 day of January, 1984 
Plaintiff: 
LUCKY 7 RODEO CORPORATION, INC. 
S/U4^< „ 
Tjrfhothy B. .Andersorf, /Z^ —-jrfn t  ^Xi 
. /At torney fo r tt  Plaintiff 
TBA821 
De^e«tJarrts2 
^t^S^^ 
Pat (Ch'as.) R. C la r 
•T/Phi l l ip^I iang Foremas te r 
Attocriey for Defendant 
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riri'r? JliulCliM. LiST MUST 
—ras '-easjp^  
H FEB 13 1984 |]1 
J 
Timothy B. Anderson of 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK SMcDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
One South Main, Suite 300 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801) 628-1627 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
r
- ^^-tSges*/
 oepurY 
LUCKY SEVEN RODEO CORPORATION 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
0-*Jf ORDER 
Civil No. 7917 
^ 
PAT CLARK, an individual/ 
Defendant, 
oooOooo 
The Court having reviewed the Stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement of the parties above named/ and good cause therefore 
showing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The claims of the respective parties heretof one 
against the other are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Title to the reservoir and dyke area shall remain in 
the name of Pat (Chas.) R. Clark and Tex Gates. Said parcel 
comprises that area used by Plaintiff Lucky Seven Ranch within 
the fence lines and within the NWl/4 NWl/4 Sec. 28, T39S, R16W 
and more specifically described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of the Northwest 
1/4 of the Northwest 1/4 of Section 28, Township 39 
«*> 
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South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
said point being S 0° 36f W 1299.425 feet along the 
Section line from the Northwest Corner of said 
Section 28 and running thence N 0° 36f E 339.00 
feet to a point on an old fence line; thence along 
an old fence line as follows: N 79° 21' 30" E 
543.00 feet; thence S 82° 30f E 30.01 feet; thence 
S 18° 50' E 261.00 feet; thence S 7° 40' 30" E 
200.00 feet to a point on the South line of the 
Northwest 1/4 of said Section 28; thence leaving 
said old fence line and running N 89° 09' 50" W 
678.00 feet along the 1/16 line to the point of 
beginning. 
Containing 5.815 Acres. 
3. Plaintiff Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation and its 
successors and assigns (hereinafter "Plaintiff") shall have an 
exclusive and perpetual easement to use, maintain and operate the 
reservoir and dyke are which are described in paragraph 2 above 
for irrigation, stock watering, corralling of animals and 
agricultural purposes, together with the obligation that 
plaintiff shall maintain the fences enclosing the area 
hereinabove described. 
4. In the event defendant is assessed a tax increase as 
a result of plaintiff's maintainance or improvement of the 
property described in paragraph 2 above, plaintiff shall 
reimburse defendant the amount of said increased assessment 
within ten (10) days written notice of payment thereof. 
5. Plaintiff shall have an easement across defendants 
land for its ditch presently running from the town of Central to 
the reservoir described as existing within the property described 
in paragraph 2 above, and plaintiff further shall have right to 
- 2 -
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improve said ditch by installation of a pipeline and have all 
necessary rights of ingress and egress to maintain the same. 
6. In the event the reservoir and dyke area described 
in paragraph 2 above were to fall into non-use for a period of 
ten (10) consecutive years, the easement granted in paragraph 3 
above would expire automatically without notice. 
7. In the event the ditch described in paragraph 5 
above were to fall into non-use for a period of twenty (20) 
consecutive years, the easement granted herein would expire 
automatically without notice. 
8. The public, including plaintiff, shall have a 
perpetual and continuous easement for use of the present roadway 
across SE1/4 NWl/4 Sec. 28, T39S, R16W, which consists of the 
present paved access road to the Brookside Estates Subdivision. 
9. An easement serving as the access road to the Lucky 
Seven Ranch would continue to exist along the lines of the 
present road from highway U-18 to the Lucky Seven Ranch, said 
road being located in NWl/4 NWl/4 Sec. 28 T39S, R16W. 
10. Plaintiff shall immediately transfer to defendant 
underground water rights in an amount sufficient to serve three 
(3) homes, with the exact amount to be determined according to 
State Division of Water Resources published standards. Defendant 
shall make use of said water by drilling his own well or create 
his own point of diversion and shall not be.entitled to use of 
- 3 - • 
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the well on plaintiff's property or within the easement area 
described in paragraph 1 above. If Defendant fails to put the 
water rights transfered hereunder to beneficial use within a 
period of five (5) years from the date hereof, said rights shall 
automatically without notice, revert to plaintiff, 
11. Parties hereby dismiss any and all claims arising 
by virtue of this action one agains 
DATED this ~7 day of -fK^^mSej^ 198,3 
BY THE COURT: 
TBA821C 
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fif„, JUDICIAL D£7 COURT 
WWWJG7CN COUNTY 
™"TS ,:;^..>-S3 t223B5-JSaK7>^ 
i i a i 
Philip L. Foremaster 
Attorney at Law 
165 North 100 East, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 572 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801)673-2209 
'J JAN 2 3 1986 |: ,13 ji 
j/jt^^ ^^rt^^.^y CL£"K 
_ _ DtPUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
LUCKY SEVEN RODEO 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
rAT CLARK, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
LEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 
uivil No. 7917 
SUPP-
Defendant 
This matter coming on for hearing before the Court sitting 
without a jury on the 13th day of November, 1985 upon the Motion 
tor Summary Judgment filed herein by Defendant based upon the 
original Judgment filed herein and upon Defendant's supplemental 
Motion for Interpretation of Judgment and for Order Terminating 
Easement and the Plaintiff being represented by its attorney 
Timothy B. Anderson and the Defendant, being present and being 
represented by his attorney Phillip L. Foremaster and the Court 
having on the 13th day of February, 1985 caused to be entered 
herein its Order and Judgment wherein pursuant to stipulation 
of the parties and after having had trial of the issues between 
the parties for approximately two days the parties settled 
the issues existing between them and stated their settlement 
in open Court and thereupon having requested the Court to enter Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
its order pursuant to said stipulation, which order, being 
prepared by counsel for Plaintiff contained in part the follow-
ing statements: 
i 
i. The claims of the respective parties hereto, one 
against the other are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Title to the reservoir and dyke area shall 
remain in the name of Pat (Chas.) R. Clark 
and Tex Gates. Said parcel comprises that area 
used by Plaintiff Lucky Seven Ranch within the 
tence lines and with the NW£ NW£ Sec. 28, T39S, R16W 
and more specifically described as follows: 
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3. Plaintiff Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation and its 
successors and assigns (hereinafter "Plaintiff") shall 
have an exclusive and perpetual easement to use, maintain 
and operate the reservoir and dyke area which are discribed 
in paragraph 2 above for irrigation, stock watering, 
corralling of animals and agricultural purposes, together 
with the obligation that plaintiff shall maintain the 
tences enclosing the area hereinabove described. 
4. In the event defendant is assessed a tax increase 
as a result of plaintiff's maintenance or improvement 
of the property described in paragraph 2 above, plaintiff 
shall reimburse defendant the amount of said increased 
assessment within ten (10) days written notice of payment 
thereof. 
!D . Plaintiff shall have an easement across defendants 
land for its ditch presently running from the town of 
Central to the reservoir described as existing with the 
property described in paragraph 2 above, and plaintiff 
further shall have right to improve said ditch by ins-
tallation o a pipeline and have all necessary rights of 
ingress and egress to maintain the same. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in paragraph 2 above were to fall into non-use for a period 
of Ten (10) consecutive years, the easement granted in 
paragraph 3 above would expire automatically without notice 
And the Defendant having filed herein his Motion for Inter-
pretation of Judgment and for Order Terminating Easement claim-
-ing as grounds for termination of said easement that the Plain-
tiff had voluntarily removed from the above described real 
property said reservoir and dyke for which said easement was 
stipulated and granted as aforesaid thereby destroying the 
reason for the existance of said easement; and 
That Plaintiff having answered said Motion for Interpre-
tation of Judgment and for Order Terminating Easement wherein 
it admitted having voluntarily removed said reservoir and dyke 
trom said real property and for which said easement was granted; 
and 
Plaintiff having further admitted that it had removed 
a portion of the fencing around said real property that it 
had agred to maintain, in violation of the parties stipulation 
and the order of the Court; and 
The Court having been asked to interpret the said previous 
Order of the Court based upon the parties' stipulation and 
the same having been prepared by counsel for Plaintiff and 
therefore to be construed in favor of Defendant and against 
Plaintiff if any controversy as to its meaning exists; and 
The Court having heard the testimony and evidence at trial 
of the above matter and having heard the verbal stipulation 
of the parties and the Court being of the opinion that the 
reason the Plaintiff was granted such easement under the part-
ies' stipulation upon said real property was to operate and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tor that purpose only and the reason for the parties* stipu-
lation regarding said easement was to provide said use and 
benefit to said abutting property; and 
The Court hereby finding that the grant of said easement 
was for the sole reason to enable Plaintiff to use and maintain 
said reservoir and dyke; and 
The Court hereby finding by clear and convincing evidence 
that at the time of the grant of said easement upon said pro-
perty there existed a reservoir and dyke thereon and since 
said time the Plaintiff has voluntarily removed the same from 
said real property thereby extinguishing the' reason for the 
grant of said easement in the first place; and 
The Plaintiff having in fact destroyed and removed said 
reservoir and dyke from said real property and further having 
removed part of the fence thereon thereby voluntarily destroying 
and reason for said easement to exist and by the distruction 
and removal of the same having manifested its intent to abandon 
the same; and 
The Plaintiff having further violated the stipulation 
of the parties and Order of the Court by failing to maintain 
the fences as provided therein; 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that the above des-
cribed easement on the above described real property granting 
to Plaintiff right to use and maintain the reservoir and dyke 
thereon and for any other purpose expressed therein is hereby 
terminated and hereby declared to have no further force and 
effect and it is hereby declared that the Plaintiff has no 
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turther right, title and interest in the above described real 
si 
property. / / 
uated this / ^ " d a x of December, r985. 
f L 
•Mhim 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on this y^^- day of 
November, 1986, I served four copies of the Appellant's Brief in 
Case No. 860067, Utah Supreme Court, on Phillip L. Foremaster, 
Counsel for Pat Clark. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
s^2sz^ 
DALE R. CHAMBERLAIN 
C4-1 
37 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
